Oxford Handbooks Online

Abstract and Keywords

Since the 1930s and 1940s until the present, populist leaders have dominated Latin America's political landscapes. This chapter explains the commonalities and differences between the different subtypes of Latin American populism—classical, neoliberal, and radical. It examines why these different manifestations of populism emerged, and their democratizing and inclusionary promises while seeking power. Then it analyzes their impact on democracy after gaining office. Whereas populists seeking power promise to include the excluded, once in power populists attacked the institutions of liberal democracy, grabbed power, aimed to control social movements and civil society, and clashed with the privately owned media.

Keywords: Latin America, classical populism, neoliberal populism, radical populism, democracy, authoritarianism

LATIN America is the land of populism.[1] From the 1930s and 1940s until the present, populist leaders have dominated the region's political landscapes. Mass politics emerged with populist challenges to the rule of elites who used fraud to remain in power. The struggle for free and open elections, and for the incorporation of those excluded from politics, is associated with the names of the leaders of the first wave of populism: Juan and Eva Perón in Argentina, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Perú, or José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador. Populist movements and governments produced deep lasting political loyalties and cleavages. Like their classical predecessors, radical populists such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador polarized their polities and the academic community into those who regarded them as democratic innovators, and those who considered them a threat to democracy.

This chapter explains the commonalities and differences between the different subtypes of Latin American populism: classical, neoliberal, and radical. It examines why these different manifestations of populism emerged, and their democratizing and inclusionary promises while seeking power. Then it analyzes their impact on democracy after gaining office. Whereas populists seeking power promised to include the excluded, once in power populists attacked the institutions of liberal democracy, grabbed power, aimed to control social movements and civil society, and clashed with the privately owned media. The next section analyzes the mechanisms used by populist leaders to forge links with their followers: populist organizations, clientelism, the mass media, and discourse. Subsequently I explain why populism continues to reappear in some countries, whereas in others it is either confined to the margins of the political system or not present.

Before proceeding, and because populism is such a contested category, I will explain how I use this category. Borrowing from strategic and discursive-ideological approaches, I understand populism as a Manichaean discourse that divides politics and society as the struggle between two irreconcilable and antagonistic camps: the people and the oligarchy or the power block. Under populism a leader claims to embody the (p. 196) unitary will of the people in their struggle for liberation. Populism produces strong popular identities and is a strategy of top-down mobilization that clashes with the autonomous demands of social movement organizations. However, populist glorification of common people and their attacks on elites could open spaces for common people to press for their agendas. The tension between top-down mobilization and autonomous mobilization from below is characteristic of populist episodes.

Classical Populism

In Latin America populism emerged in the 1930s and 1940s with the crisis of the oligarchical social order that combined liberal-inspired constitutions (division of powers, and elections) with patrimonial practices and values in predominantly rural societies. These estate-based societies had relations of domination and subordination characterized by unequal reciprocity. Institutional and everyday practices of domination excluded the majority of the population from politics and from the public sphere, which were kept in the hands of elites.

Processes of urbanization, industrialization, and a generalized crisis of paternal authority allowed populist leaders to emerge. Classical populist leaders of the 1930s and 1940s such as Juan Perón and José María Velasco Ibarra fought against electoral fraud, expanded the franchise, and were exalted as the embodiment of the nation's true, uncorrupted traditions and values against those of foreign-oriented elites. In more economically developed nations such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, populist presidents pursued nationalist and redistributive social policies that coincided with the period of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Populism also emerged in agrarian

contexts. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, populism was not linked to industrialization, even though, as in the industrializing republics, it led to the political inclusion of previously excluded electors.

In some countries populist leaders built enduring political organizations, such as Peru's APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), Bolivia's Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, MNR), and Argentina's Peronist party. In other countries such as Ecuador, populist leaders did not create or institutionalize formal parties, and electoral coalitions were assembled for different electoral contests. Kenneth Roberts (2006) explained these different approaches to institution building in terms of the levels of polarization and confrontation provoked by different populist experiences. In some cases, such as Argentina and Peru, the polarized construction of politics ended in a total and fundamental struggle or cleavage between "the people" and "the oligarchy." To sustain conflict with the elite, leaders needed to organize followers in political parties and in civil society organizations. In other experiences, such as that of Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, there was political but not social polarization. The level of confrontation was not as intense, and Velasco Ibarra did not feel impelled to create formal political and social organizations.

(p. 197) Populist leaders exalted workers as the soul of their nations while simultaneously repressing and co-opting existing labor groups. Social historians have shown how workers strategically used populist political openings to press for autonomous demands against specific bosses and elites. The labor historian Joel Wolfe (1994) described a form of workers' populism under Vargas. Similarly, Daniel James (1988) showed how Argentine workers used the Peronist opening and discourse to attack the symbols of their exclusion from the public sphere and to demand their recognition as workers and citizens. Perón extended the notion of democracy from political rights to include workers' participation in the social and economic life of the nation.

Latin American populists were famous for turning the stigmas of the poor into virtues. In the 1930s and 1940s the elites of Buenos Aires referred to the internal migrants using the term "cabecita negra" to refer to "the subject's dark skin and black hair" (Milanesio, 2010: 55). They called them "black Peronists," or "greasers"—evoking not only the dirt and oil on workers' overalls, but all that is cheap or of bad taste. Juan and his wife Eva Perón transformed the stigmas of these terms. Eva, for instance, used "the term grasita to affectionately refer to the poor" (Milanesio, 2010: 57).

The democratic credentials of classical populists lies in their struggles for open and free elections, and their demands to incorporate the excluded. Peronism expanded the franchise, and voter turnout during Perón's first government grew from 18 to 50 percent of the population. In 1951, under Perón, women won the right to vote, and 64 percent of women voted for the Peronist ticket (Plotkin, 2003: 165). "During Perón's terms in office the share of the national GDP represented by wages increased from 37 to 47 per cent, while real wages increased by 40 per cent between 1946 and 1949" (Plotkin, 2010: 273).

Latin American populists privileged notions of democracy based on the aesthetic and liturgical incorporation of common people in mass rallies more than the institutionalization of popular participation through the rule of law. This explains why the heyday of Latin American populism was associated with moments of collective action such as 17 October 1945 when crowds took over streets and plazas to show their support for Colonel Juan Perón, who claimed to be the embodiment of their will. However, as critics of populism have been arguing for a long time, mobilization and participation in mass rallies did not entail autonomy (Germani, 1971). Populist redemption was based on the authoritarian appropriation of the people's will. Because populist politicians claimed to embody the people, and the people's will was not given institutional channels to express itself, populist regimes replaced rational deliberation with plebiscitary acclamation. Moreover, due to their Manichean discourse and the resulting polarization of political and social cleavages, populist moments resembled situations of war. The foes and friends of populism saw each other as enemies and not as democratic rivals who seek negotiations and agreements.

One of the principal legacies of classical populism was its deep ambivalence toward liberal democracy. That is, classical populism was democratizing to the extent that previously excluded groups were brought into the political system; at the same time, however, populist leaders refused to accept the constraints and limitations of liberal constitutional principles that served to constrain state power, guarantee the political (p. 198) autonomy of civil society, and assure pluralism (Peruzzotti, 2008). After winning his first democratic election in 1946 Perón said: "we have given the people the opportunity to choose, in the cleanest election in the history of Argentina, between us and our opponents. The people have elected us, so the problem is resolved. What we want is now done in the Republic of Argentina" (Peruzzotti, 2008: 109).

Neoliberal Populism

Differently from classical populism, which brought marginalized people into the political community, neoliberal populism took place in the 1990s in nations where most had the right to vote and were already organized by political parties. Leaders such as Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru were elected after the failure of import substitution industrialization led to economic catastrophes, as inflation reached levels of 30 to 50 percent per month. They blamed traditional politicians, arguing that they had appropriated the people's sovereignty and led their countries into economic chaos. Some neoliberal populists like Fujimori and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil ran as political outsiders. Others like Menem got to power against the wishes of their party's leadership, and Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador used his personalistic party to challenge the political establishment.

Political parties and elites were portrayed not only as out of touch with the needs and desires of the electorate, but also as enemies of "the people." Fujimori and Bucaram were elected as symbols of the rejection of traditional white political elites. In January, 1990, when Fujimori appeared as the third contestant in opinion polls, the candidate of a coalition of right-wing forces, the internationally acclaimed novelist Mario Vargas Llosa was asked to give his opinion about Fujimori. He replied, "But nobody knows that *chinito* (little China man)." The next day Fujimori opened a major rally in a Lima shantytown with the phrase, "Here we are, the *chinitos* and the *cholitos*" [poor mestizos]. In this fashion, the election became a confrontation between the white elite (*blanquitos* and *pitucos*) and the non-white common people: *chinitos* and *cholitos* (Degregori, 1991: 115). Fujimori, like many Peruvians of indigenous background, was the son of immigrants who had to struggle with "deficient" Spanish, and was discriminated against by traditional white elites. Hence the allure of his simple slogan: "a president like you."

Similarly, after Ecuador's former right-wing president, León Febres Cordero, stated in 1996 that the voters for Bucaram were a "bunch of prostitutes and thieves," Bucaram transformed the meaning of these insults used to describe his base of support by saying that the only prostitutes and thieves were the members of the Ecuadorian oligarchy. During his presidential campaigns and short six-month term in office Bucaram claimed to embody the authentic values, cultures, and aspirations of the poor against those of foreign-oriented elites.

Fernando Collor cultivated the image of a young and energetic political outsider, a messiah acting above and beyond the interests of workers' unions or employers' (p. 199) associations. His mission was to destroy the privileges of inefficient bureaucrats, the *marajás*, to bring redemption to his followers. In the 1989 presidential campaign, Menem projected the image of a winner who has triumphed in two mythologized arenas of social mobility: sports and show business. That is why a few months after becoming president he declared, "I am the president of the nation and I play soccer with Maradona. What else can I ask in life?" (Novaro and Palerm, 1996: 213).

Illustrating how populism lacks an ideology and can be either right or left-wing, once in power these leaders abandoned the nationalist and statist policies of their classical predecessors. They shrank the size of the state and opened their economies. In many instances they privatized what their populist predecessors had nationalized. Draconian shock treatments brought inflation down in Argentina and Peru. In Argentina it "fell from 3,079 percent to 8 percent between 1989 and 1994, while in Peru it declined from 7,650 percent to under 40 percent between 1990 and 1993" (Weyland, 1999: 188).

Neoliberal populists met with differing degrees of success in exercising and holding onto power. Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador lasted scarcely six months; lacking an institutional base, he was removed by the Congress on the dubious legal grounds that he was mentally incapable of governing. Fernando Collor in Brazil similarly had a weak support base in the legislature and could not survive corruption scandals. By contrast, Carlos Menem and Alberto Fujimori were both reelected to second terms. Their success was explained by

how they had lowered hyperinflation and the fact that the privatization of state-owned enterprises gave them funds to pursue patronage and clientelism. Ultimately, the Fujimori regime collapsed under the weight of scandals related to corruption and electoral fraud (he is currently serving time in a Peruvian prison for his involvement in corruption and human rights abuses). Menem's quest for a third term was ruled unconstitutional.

Neoliberal populist leaders had a variety of effects on democratization in their respective countries. Under Menem, the transformation of Perónist identity from an antagonistic opposition between the people and the oligarchy into a more amorphous and less confrontational version with broader appeal made neoliberal populism, in Kurt Weyland's (2001: 16) words, "more representative than classical populism and more compatible with liberal democracy." In Fujimori's Peru liberal democratic institutions were attacked and destroyed. Fujimori "denounced members of Congress as 'unproductive charlatans,' Congress as a 'large, heavy, thick-skinned pachyderm,' and judges as 'jackals.' Fujimori belittled not only existing political parties, but also the concept of parties; they were '*palabrería*' (all talk and no action)" (McClintock, 2013: 223).

Radical Populism

The extensive bibliography on the turn to the left and the rebirth of radical populism in Latin America agrees that the emergence of the governments of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa was explained by three endogenous factors (Weyland, (p. 200) Madrid, and Hunter, 2010; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; de la Torre and Arnson, 2013). The first was a crisis of political representation. Traditional political parties and the institutional framework of democracy were in crisis. Parties were perceived as instruments of local and foreign elites that implemented neoliberal policies that increased social inequality. These leaders rose to power with platforms that promised to wipe away corrupt politicians and traditional parties, to experiment with participatory forms of democracy, and to implement policies to redistribute income.

Radical populists brought back the old leftist utopias of socialism and revolution, but with a new twist. Instead of violence, these leaders advocated for the revolutionary role of constituent power. Yet similarly to the old left, they disdained constituted power. Constituent power was understood as a revolutionary force that ought to be permanently activated to found again from scratch all the corrupt political institutions that had served the interests of foreign powers and local elites. They were elected with the promise to convene constitutional assemblies that, with the participation of social movements and common citizens, were tasked to draft new constitutions. These new constitutions expanded citizens' rights while simultaneously concentrating power in the executive.

The second cause that explains the rebirth of radical populism in Latin America was widespread popular resistance to neoliberalism. On February 27, 1989, the Venezuelan Caracazo—a massive insurrection against the hike in the price of gasoline—took place.

"Many cities were paralyzed by the multitudes who blocked roads and looted thousands of commercial establishments" (López Maya and Panzarelli, 2013: 224). This rebellion conveyed elite nightmares of a savage and uncivilized rabble that invaded the centers of civility. These constructions of the poor as the rabble and as the antithesis to reason and civilized behavior allowed or justified the state's fierce and brutal repression, which ended in at least four hundred deaths. Hugo Chávez, who led a failed coup in 1992, was elected in 1998 with the promise to get rid of neoliberalism and the cartel of corrupt politicians.

Between 1997 and 2005 the three elected presidents of Ecuador—Abdalá Bucaram (1996–1997), Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000), and Lucio Gutiérrez (2003–2005)—were deposed in events where social movements and citizens occupied public spaces to protest against neoliberalism and political corruption. Sociologist León Zamosc (2013: 265) interpreted these uprisings as instances of popular impeachment that applied "the ultimate accountability sanction for a president: removal from office." Rafael Correa, a college professor who never belonged to a political party, was elected in 2006 with a platform to reverse neoliberalism, convene a constituent assembly, and revive national sovereignty.

From 2000 to 2003 Bolivia underwent a cycle of protest and political turmoil that resulted in the collapse of the party system established in 1985, and of the neoliberal economic model. Coalitions of rural and urban indigenous organizations, coca growers, and middle-class sectors fought against water privatization, increasing taxation, the forced eradication of coca leaves, and the surrender of gas reserves to multinational interests. Democratic legitimacy was understood to lie in crowd action where the people directly expressed its sovereignty. The state increasingly relied on repression, in turn radicalizing protestors. In the end, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada was forced to (p. 201) leave Bolivia and was succeeded by his vice president Carlos Mesa. Insurgents refused to take power, and "Morales supported a constitutional exit from the crisis in 2003" (Postero, 2010: 14). The insurgents accomplished their goals of getting rid of the neoliberal model, and defending Bolivia's national resources.

A third cause was that citizens perceived that politicians and neoliberal elites had surrendered national sovereignty to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US government. Venezuela had changed its pro–third world foreign policy, and become an advocate of neoliberal reform and free trade. In a desperate move to stop hyperinflation in 2000 Ecuador had given up its national currency the Sucre for the US dollar. Bolivia had undergone social strife and human rights abuses as the military unsuccessfully followed US policies of forceful eradication of coca leaf production. Radical populists promised to bring back the interest of the nation state, and to build a multipolar world. They had anti-globalization and anti–United States postures at the core of their foreign policy rhetoric and strategies.

Populism in Latin America

Despite important differences, the governments of Hugo Chávez–Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador represent a new and distinct phase of radical populism in the region (de la Torre and Arnson, 2013). First, these leaders engaged in permanent political campaigns, using the convening of frequent elections to displace older elites, rally supporters, and consolidate their hegemony. Second, these leaders claimed to be the embodiment of superior forms of democracy that would solve the participatory and representative deficits of liberal democracy, and fulfill the democratizing goal of promoting equality and social justice. For Correa, for example, the essence of democratic citizenship resided in the socio-economic sphere and depended on state policies to advance social justice. For Chávez and Maduro, advancing democracy depended on replacing the unresponsive institutions of liberal democracy with new forms of direct, participatory democracy. And for Morales democracy meant replacing and/or complementing liberal institutions with forms of indigenous communal democracy designed to enhance indigenous participation.

Third, constituent assemblies drafted new constitutions in all three countries to "refound" the nation. The goal was to establish a different kind of democracy, based on elections, but also on a new constitutional order that concentrates power in the hands of the president. Majoritarian mobilization led by a personalistic leader took precedence over the checks and balances and respect for basic civil rights inherent in liberal democracy. Mechanisms of horizontal accountability by other branches of government and an independent press have been replaced by a variant of vertical accountability involving frequent elections, referendums, and plebiscites.

Fourth, in emphasizing substantive democracy, all three regimes relied on state intervention in the economy in the name of distributing wealth and reducing poverty and inequality. Although this statist, redistributionist aspect of populism is not new, governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador were rich in hydrocarbons and reaped huge benefits from the commodity boom of the 2000s that sent oil and natural gas prices to record levels. As a result of enhanced revenues, public investment and social spending skyrocketed and poverty rates and, to a lesser extent, inequality fell when the prices of (p. 202) oil and other commodities were high (Lusting, 2009). Populist social programs had the advantage of rapidly targeting the poor; such programs served to boost the popularity of presidents and functioned as a visible instrument for maintaining power. At the same time, however, they suffered from major flaws in design. Social programs were haphazard and politicized, lacking in efficiency, transparency, and institutionalization. Because they were tied to the persona of the president—who distributed benefits primarily to his or her political supporters rather than on the basis of universal, objective criteria—programs were unlikely to survive beyond the mandate of a particular government. The fiscal foundation of social programs, especially those that rely so heavily on oil and other windfall commodity rents, were unsustainable in the long run (Weyland, 2006). Falling prices of oil led to a dramatic increase of poverty in Venezuela. In 2015 the

level of poverty was 45 percent, three points higher that it was when Chávez was first elected in 1998 (Arenas, 2016).

Despite similarities, there are important differences in how these governments were linked with social movements. Evo Morales came to power at the peak of indigenous-led popular protest against neoliberalism and pacted democracy. His party was the political instrument of strong social movements. Participation in Bolivia was to a large extent grounded in communitarian traditions where all participate and deliberate until a decision is made. Leaders at all levels were accountable to their social base. Participation under Morales was more bottom-up, and organizations of the subaltern had the capacity to force the government to reverse policies (Crabtree, 2013).

Differently from Morales, who came to power at the peak of a cycle of protest, Correa was elected when the indigenous movement entered into a crisis, temporarily losing its capacity to engage in sustained collective action. The Ecuadorian opposition did not have the resources to engage in acts of collective defiance against Correa's administration, nor were the stakes perceived to be as high as in Bolivia or Venezuela. Coupled with Correa's technocratic leadership style, his government did not organize the subaltern beyond elections, and has not promoted mechanisms of participatory democracy at the local and community levels (de la Torre, 2013).

The relative weakness of social movements and the exclusion of the informal sector from corporatist organizations during the reign of the two party system known as *Punto fijo* democracy allowed Chávez to create organizations of the subaltern from the top down. The opposition had the organizational strength and the perception that the stakes were serious enough to use collective action to defy and even to try to topple Chávez. The government responded by further organizing popular sectors. Even though organizations of the subaltern were created from the top down, citizens used these organizations to try to push for their autonomous agendas.

The populist view of a homogeneous and inherently virtuous people contributed to the creation of authoritarian governments in Venezuela and Ecuador. Chávez claimed to be the embodiment of the Venezuelan people: "This is not about Hugo Chávez, this about a people" (Zúquete, 2008: 100). Because his mission was to redeem his people from oppression he could say: "I demand absolute loyalty to me. I am not an individual, I am the people" (Gómez Calcaño and Arenas, 2013: 20). Similarly, after winning his second (p. 203) presidential election in 2009 Rafael Correa asserted, "Ecuador voted for itself." He portrayed his struggle on behalf of the poor and the nation as heroic: "We defeated the representatives of the most reactionary sectors of the oligarchy, corrupt bankers, and the media that defend the past." He claimed that his revolution "is irreversible, and nobody would stop it." "We are ready to risk our lives to bring change" (de la Torre, 2012: 256–7).

Chávez did not face political rivals but the oligarchy defined as the enemies of the people, "those self-serving elites who work against the homeland" (Zúquete, 2008: 105). He confronted the oligarchy using a polarizing discourse. He called traditional politicians imbeciles, squalid ones, and little Yankees. He referred to the owners of the media as the "four horsemen of the Apocalypse." Similarly Rafael Correa faced a long list of enemies to his government, his people, and his nation. The list included traditional politicians, the owners of the privately owned media, journalists, the leadership of autonomous social movements, the infantile left, and almost anybody who questioned his policies.

The populist category of the people does not necessarily need to be imagined as one, and does not necessarily lead to the creation of an authoritarian government. In Bolivia, who can speak on behalf of the Bolivian people is contested between powerful social movements and Evo Morales, who at times has tried to embody the will of a unitary people. The Constitution of 2009 declared Bolivia a plurinational and communitarian state. The MAS did not use exclusionary ethnic appeals; on the contrary they constructed the notion of the people as multiethnic and plural (Madrid, 2012). Yet at times Evo Morales has attempted to be the only voice of the people. When indigenous people from the lowlands challenged his policies of mineral extraction they were depicted as manipulated by foreign NGOs, and as not truly indigenous. Morales's regime attempted to impose a hegemonic vision of indigeneity as loyalty to his government. But because of the power of social movements Morales has not been able to impose visions of the people-as-one. In contemporary Bolivia, according to anthropologist Nancy Postero (2015: 422), we are witnessing an "ongoing struggle to define who counts as el pueblo boliviano, and what that means for Bolivian democracy."

Leaders and Followers: How Are They Linked, Organized, and Mobilized?

Researchers have distinguished four linkages between leaders and followers in the three subtypes of populism discussed in this chapter: populist organization, clientelism, the mass media—particularly television—and populist discourse. Populist organizations are based on low levels of institutionalization (Hawkins, 2008). Leaders set their agendas and strategies, and it is difficult to build identities that differ from the image of the people as constructed by leaders. Even though populists actively organized supporters within their movements, these organizations are based on insularity, as they do not promote solidarity with similar organizations in civil society. Populist organizations do not value (p. 204) pluralism because they adopt the idea of the popular as an undifferentiated fusion of "the romantic notion of the people—folk—with the Marxian idea of class … transforming the people into a unified, homogeneous entity" (Avritzer, 2002: 72). Hence the people can only be organized under organizations that are loyal to the leaders. Yet sometimes, common people use populist organizations, the openings of the political system under

populism, and the rhetorical claims that they are the true nation to present their own demands.

Populist organizations created by Chávez's government such as Bolivarian Circles, Communal Councils, Urban Land Committees, and Technical Water Roundtables illustrate the tension between the autonomous organizations of the subaltern and their subordination to a charismatic leader. In order to promote the revolutionary process, President Chávez encouraged the formation of Bolivarian Circles in June, 2001. These were "small groups of seven to fifteen people … intended to study the ideology of Bolivarianism, discuss local issues and defend the revolution" (Raby, 2006: 188). In their heyday, Bolivarian Circles boasted approximately 2.2 million members and had an active role in the massive demonstrations rescuing President Chávez when he was temporarily removed from office in an April, 2002, coup d'état. Kirk Hawkins and David Hansen (2006: 127) showed that mobilization of the Bolivarian Circles was not necessarily based in the "kind of autonomy that democracy requires." Their study demonstrated that even though Bolivarian Circles did constitute forms of participation for poor people, they often worked as clientelar networks to transfer resources to neighborhoods where the president had supporters.

Communal Councils were conceived as institutions to promote popular power and were seen as the foundation for the future establishment of a socialist direct and pyramidal democracy. Critics and supporters of the Bolivarian Revolution agree that communal Councils so far have faced the same problems as the Bolivarian Circles, namely the persistence of clientelism in the exchange of social services for political support, and a charismatic style of rule that neutralizes or prevents autonomous grassroots inputs (Wilpert, 2007: 195–204).

Bolivarian Circles and Communal Councils may have experienced problems of autonomy because they were created from above. Other institutions such as the Urban Land Committees and Technical Water Roundtables, for example, accepted more autonomous grassroots inputs. The government gave squatter settlements collective titles to land on which precarious self-built dwellings were situated. Through this process, "the community forms an urban land committee to administer its new collective property and to undertake and demand support for material improvement such as water, sewerage and electricity services or road paving" (Raby, 2006: 188–9). Similarly, local water committees "arrange the distribution of water between neighboring communities which share the same water mains" (Raby, 2006: 189). Nevertheless, Urban Land and Water Committees lacked autonomy from the charismatic leader, as Chávez was the guiding force for these institutions (García, 2007).

Populist parties and movements are organized through formal bureaucratic party networks and clientelist and informal networks that distribute resources, information, and jobs to the poor. The first round of studies on political clientelism showed that the poor were not irrational masses that voted for populist demagogic candidates. The poor

(p. 205) voted instrumentally for the candidate with the best capacity to deliver goods and services (Menéndez Carrión, 1986).

The poor in Latin America live under conditions of material and legal deprivation, and in environments of dire violence and insecurity. Because their constitutionally prescribed civil rights are not always respected, the poor rely on politicians and their networks of brokers to have access to a bed in a public hospital, or a job. Brokers are the intermediaries between politicians and poor people. They hoard information and resources and are connected to wider networks and cliques of politicians and state officials. Formal bureaucratic rules work together with personalist cliques and networks of friends who dispense "favors," including corruption.

Because the poor can choose to leave a broker and join a different network, brokers' positions are unstable, and the poor cannot be seen as a manipulated and captive voting base. The poor can exit a network, they can also choose to not vote as the broker requested, or might feel compelled to repay a favor to the broker. The unreliable nature of political support gives certain advantages to the poor. For the system of exchanges to work, politicians have to deliver at least some resources.

Like other political parties, populists exchange services for votes. But in addition to offering material rewards, populist exchanges go together with a discourse that portrays common people as the essence of the nation. In addition to exchanging material goods for votes, populist networks also generate political identities (Auyero, 2001). The resilience of Peronism among the poor, for example, was partially explained by the informal and clientelist networks of the Peronist Party, which in addition to delivering material resources to the poor recreated political and cultural identities (Auyero, 2001; Levistky, 2001).

Latin American populists were media innovators. Eva Perón used the radio to communicate directly with her followers, transforming politics into a melodrama where she staged her love to the poor.

> Her scenarios never changed and her characters were stereotyped by the same adjectives: Perón was always "glorious," the people "marvelous," the oligarchy *egoísta y vende patria* [selfish and corrupt], and she was a "humble" or "weak" woman, "burning her life for them" so that social justice could be achieved, *cueste lo que cueste y caiga quien caiga* [at whatever cost and regardless of consequences].
>
> (Navarro, 1982: 59)

Television became one of the main venues used by populists to win elections, and to govern. Populists creatively blended exposure on television with traditional mechanisms of vote gathering, like mass rallies and clientelist networks. Some like Carlos Menem were innovators. Following the example of Pope John Paul II, he visited common people in their neighborhoods in his *menemovil*. His image had more in common with a "religious

leader or a show business celebrity, than with a typical politician campaigning" (Novaro and Palermo, 1996: 207). Like Menem, Abdalá Bucaram used the media to represent his government as a televised show. With constant media exposure, Menem and (p. 206) Bucaram attempted to construct their personas as central political events. They used sports and popular culture to demonstrate that they were like the common man, and to simultaneously show that they were superior because they triumphed in these nonpolitical arenas. Menem played soccer with Maradona, and Bucaram sang and danced on television. While Menem was successful in using television to help him to secure his rule, Bucaram failed because upper- and middle-class publics read his performances as an eruption of vulgarity in the presidential palace (de la Torre, 2010).

Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa developed weekly television programs where they informed citizens about their governmental projects and policies, set the news agenda for the week, and simultaneously entertained the public by singing and mocking their political enemies. Like other populists, they had conflict with the privately owned media closing and censoring critical media venues. Fujimori used corruption to silence journalists and to create tabloids that supported his government (McClintock, 2013). Chávez and Correa were convinced that the media were the main tool used by the opposition, and that they have a big role in forging hegemony (Waisbord, 2013). They formed state-owned media venues. In nations without traditions of public media, these venues functioned as tools of government propaganda in the hands of the executive. They created laws and state institutions to control what the private media could publish, and to sanction the infractions of journalists and media owners. As a result, journalists and media owners self-censored their publications, and the quality of debates in the public sphere deteriorated.

Post-structuralists argue that discourse is "the primary terrain within which the social is constituted" (Laclau, 2005: 49). Scholars who do not accept the epistemological and ontological assumptions of their post-structuralist peers also consider discourse as one of the defining traits of populism. They claim that this particular way of framing social reality produces antagonistic conflict between groups, and constitutes identities. Populism constructs the struggle between the people and the oligarchy as an ethical and moral confrontation between good and evil, redemption and downfall. The term "the people," however, is profoundly vague and elastic. In order to disentangle its ambiguities it is important to start with Laclau's (2005: 48) observation that the people "as operating in populist discourses is never a primary datum but a construct—populist discourse does not simply *express* some kind of original popular identity; it actually *constitutes* the latter." What needs to be researched is: Who is excluded and included in these discursive constructs? Who has created these categories? And, what are the levels of social and or political polarization produced by populist discourse?

Populist rhetoric in Latin America historically constructed the people as urban and mestizo (ethnically and culturally mixed folk) who had an antagonistic relationship with the oligarchy. The exaltation of poor and mestizo as the essence of the nation repelled elites who were terrified by populist challenges. The populist creation of a virtuous and

mestizo nation, however, excluded those of indigenous and African descent. In order to belong to the people and to the nation, indigenous and Afro-descendants were encouraged to adopt national-mestizo values, to reject their cultural specificity, and to whiten themselves.

During the 1952 Bolivian revolution, for example, the "Indian was erased in favor of a mestizo identity," and languages of class tried to conceal ethnicity (Canessa, 2006: 245). (p. 207) Due to the strength of indigenous organizations the discursive elaborations of who belongs to the people changed. Evo Morales and his party Movimiento al Socialismo replaced "the mestizo as the iconic citizen with the indígena" (Canessa, 2006: 255). Morales's success is explained, in part, by his ability to articulate anxieties provoked by globalization while presenting indigenous people as the essence of the nation. Raúl Madrid (2012) uses the term ethnopopulism to explain the success of Morales's strategies in using populist and inclusionary ethnic appeals. The confrontation was between those who have struggled to defend Bolivia's natural resources—indigenous people—and the oligarchy that has transferred them to imperialist and foreign powers (Canessa, 2006).

The degree of social and political polarization produced by populist discourse allows for a differentiation between experiences. In some cases, such as in Chavismo as well as in the classical populist experience of Peronism, the Manichean construction of politics ends in a total and fundamental struggle between the people, as a social and political category, and the oligarchy. Chavez's nationalism, anti-imperialism, positive glorifications of *el pueblo* as *el soberano*, and his use of mass meetings and mobilization, are similar to the already mentioned classical populist experience. But most important is that his movement politicized economic, cultural, and ethnic cleavages. In other cases, for instance Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s in Peru or Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador in the 1940s, the terms *pueblo* and *oligarquía* had political but not necessarily social contents. Political polarization did not lead to social polarization. Finally, there are mixed cases, such as Abdalá Bucaram's and Lucio Gutiérrez's elections and short administrations in Ecuador. Despite their attempts to bring traditional elites abroad into their neoliberal project, their personas brought political, social, and even cultural polarization. All of their actions, words, and performances were read through class lines and were portrayed by the upper and middle class as the embodiment of the culture of the rabble.

Populism cannot be reduced to the words, actions, and strategies of leaders. The autonomous expectations, cultures, and discourses of followers are equally important in understanding the populist bond. In order to comprehend the appeal of populism, serious attention should be paid to the words, communications, and conversations between leaders and followers as they occur during political rallies. Populist narratives empowered common people who have to endure humiliations in their daily lives. Populist leaders have symbolically dignified the poor and the non-white who are portrayed by elites and the media as the rabble, the embodiment of barbarism.

Why Does Populism Reappear in Some Nations and Not in Others?

Whereas populist leaders of different ideologies keep on reappearing in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, in Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, and Costa Rica populist leaders did not get to power. When populism emerged in the latter nations, such as with Jorge Eliecer Gaitán in Colombia in the 1930s and 1940s, he did not win the (p. 208) 1946 presidential election, was assassinated in 1948, and a wave of violence erupted in the aftermath (Braun, 1985). The most common explanations for the absence of populism in some nations of Latin America are strong party systems and functioning liberal democracies upholding the rule of law.

Populism, as Kenneth Roberts (2015: 147–8) argues, is the result of a crisis of political representation. It first emerged when excluded people without partisan loyalty were enfranchised for the first time. In some countries, like in Colombia and Uruguay, traditional political parties incorporated the previously excluded. However, in most countries, like Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Peru, "new labor-based populist parties and political movements arose in opposition to the oligarchical political establishment reconfiguring party systems around an elite/popular sociopolitical cleavage." In Ecuador populism emerged with Velasco Ibarra in the 1930s and 1940s but he did not organize followers in stable parties or organizations of civil society.

A second crisis of political representation was produced by political systems such as Venezuela's two parties system, when it became unresponsive and unaccountable in the 1990s. Hugo Chávez rebelled against closed, self-interested, and self-reproducing cartel parties. A third scenario for a crises of political representation, according to Roberts (2015: 149), occurs when "political representation and political competition tend to become highly personalized, voters support and identify with leaders rather than party organizations or platforms, and the axes of political competition are likewise drawn between rival personalities who claim to better represent the true interests of the people." Under these conditions a series of populist leaders, political outsiders, and personalist leaders as in Ecuador or Peru emerged and rose to power.

Another hypothesis to explain the attraction of populism has focused on the particular form of political incorporation in Latin America: one based on weak citizenship rights and strong rhetorical appeals to, and mobilization of, *el pueblo* (de la Torre, 2010: 124–5). In Latin America, there is a duality between the official recognition of rights in constitutions and the rhetoric of state officials and the weak implementation of these same rights in everyday life. The rule of law is tenuous at best; at worst, the law appears to serve only the interests of the powerful few. A vast social science literature has explored these "deficits" in the quality of democracy in Latin America, the truncated nature of citizenship, and the difficulties of democratic deepening once democracy's electoral dimensions have been established. Not all forms of legal, political, or socio-economic

exclusion give rise to populism. But in the absence or discrediting of mechanisms of political mediation and institutions of representation, populist interventions that give name to and politicize people's daily experiences of marginalization and humiliation remain a constant possibility. As Kirk Hawkins argues (2010: 149), "a Manichaean discourse denouncing elite conspiracies and celebrating the eventual triumph of the popular will speaks to a real underlying problem of democratic failure in which the vast majority of citizens are poorly served by a dysfunctional or even predatory state." Nations where citizens perceive that the rule of law protects them from the state and the powerful, such as Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica, are free of populism.

(p. 209) Populism occurred in three distinct historical waves, and as Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) argues we have to account for its mechanisms of diffusion and emulation. Perón and Chávez purposefully aimed to export their models of political transformation and their ideologies not only to Latin America, but also to the world at large, generously funding politicians and social movements. The current wave of radical populism was influenced by Chávez's script of political transformation. Without denying the importance of endogenous factors it is evident that Chávez's model was emulated and adapted in Ecuador and Bolivia where leaders conveyed constitutional assemblies, concentrated power in the executive, enacted laws to regulate the content of what the privately owned media could publish, regulated NGOs, and co-opted independent social movements. These self-described Bolivarian nations also claimed to be implementing policies to reach a different form of development based on the ideology of socialism in the twenty-first century, and forged the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples as an alternative to US-led free trade agreements.

Conclusions

Populism is based on the discursive antagonistic confrontation between the people and the power block. Latin American populists shared understandings of democracy as mass action on behalf of a leader constructed as the incarnation of democratic ideals, more than in the institutionalization of democracy through the rule of law. Populism is not tied to specific social and economic conditions, and might arise in nations with fragile institutions, and where the rule of law is weak. In nations where the poor have to endure humiliations by the rich and by state officials, the populist temptation to transform stigmas into sources of dignity and pride is always present.

Classical populism represented the first incorporation of previously excluded people into the national community. It was based on the exaltation of common people as the embodiment of true and uncorrupted national traditions and values against foreign-oriented elites. In the more developed nations such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil it built or co-opted labor organizations, and followed nationalist and redistributive social policies that coincided with import substitution industrialization. In more agrarian-based societies it was not linked to policies of industrialization, but represented the political inclusion of previously excluded electors. Populists expanded the franchise, and through mass rallies and demonstration gave a symbolic sense of inclusion and dignity to the poor and the marginalized. In many nations it built long-lasting organizations that created strong political loyalties.

Neoliberal populists used discourses against political parties portraying them as oligarchic cliques that have illegally appropriated the people's sovereignty. Differently from classical populist experiences where political schism led to social polarization, these movements and regimes were confined to political divisions. In some cases, such as Fujimori's Peru, neoliberal populism led to the destruction of previously existing (p. 210) political systems. Similarly to classical populism it included previously excluded people, this time those who made a living in the informal sector and were not part of working- or middle-class organizations. As with classical populism it led to the renewal of economic elites, as business people without social recognition sought to be accepted as equals by well-established elites. Even though in their rhetoric they focused on the values of common people portrayed as the essence of the nation, their policies abandoned nationalism, pursued the opening of their economies to international markets, and reduced the size of the state.

Radical populists of the twenty-first century are similar to classical populists in their politicization of social and economic exclusions. As in some classical populist experiences, political and social polarizations coincided. Similarly to neoliberal populists, they portrayed traditional political parties as the source of their country's ills, and contributed to the collapse of party systems. They linked neoliberal economic policies directly with liberal politics, practices, and values. As a result the evils of "the long night of neoliberalism," as Correa liked to say, were intimately tied to the failures of liberal

democracy. Their nationalist and statist policies were similar to those of their classical predecessors. In mineral-rich nations such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, they reversed neoliberal policies, and implemented nationalist and redistributive policies based on mineral resources rent. Yet they kept policies of their neoliberal populist cousins that targeted the poor who make a living in the informal sector.

Radical populists of the twenty-first century differed in their leadership styles and in the type of relationship between leaders and social movement organizations. Rafael Correa, Hugo Chávez, and Nicolás Maduro resorted to a leadership style based on unity and command from above where the leader appears to be the condensation of diverse demands made from below. These leaders claimed to embody the demands of diverse constituencies, and to directly represent the sovereignty of the people. Evo Morales followed a different leadership strategy. He pursued convergence and persuasion, allowing more autonomy to his grassroots constituency (French, 2009: 367). Chávez, Maduro, and Correa followed top-down strategies of mobilization, and co-opted previously existing social movement organizations. Morales built his leadership on a network of autonomous movement organizations. It remains to be seen whether these organizations will keep their autonomy, or if they will be included and co-opted into corporatist structures like the ones built by the MNR in the 1950s. Like previous populists, they promised better democratic arrangements to improve on the failures of participation and representation in liberal democratic regimes. Yet, as in previous populism, popular organizations were subordinated to the will of leaders, and atmospheres of political confrontation and polarization were created. In Venezuela and Ecuador authoritarian tendencies prevailed. In Bolivia the strength of social movements and the inclusion of indigenous people might mitigate Morales's authoritarian temptations.

As with the previous waves, radical populism was unstable. Its nationalism, anti-imperialism, and redistribution rested on the high prices of commodities. These were hyper-personalistic regimes, and as Chávez's death illustrated, charisma could not be (p. 211) transferred to a hand-picked successor. Yet despite these vulnerabilities, radical populism had strong ideological appeals. In a world dominated by neoliberalism, and with increasing inequalities, it promised social justice, and the democratization of society via the transformative power of constituent power. Yet, its views of the people as one, of rivals as enemies, and of popular sovereignty as one and undivided led to the creation of authoritarian governments.

References

Arenas, Nelly. 2016. "El chavismo sin Chávez: la deriva de un populismo sin carisma," *Nueva Sociedad*, 261: 13–22.

Auyero, Javier. 2001. *Poor People's Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Avritzer, Leonardo. 2002. *Democracy and the Public Sphere in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Braun, Herbert. 1985. *The Assassination of Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Canessa, Andrew. 2006. "Todos somos indígenas: toward a new language of national political identity," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25(2): 241–63.

Crabtree, John. 2013. "From the MNR to the MAS: populism, parties, the state, and social movements in Bolivia since 1952," in Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia Arnson (eds), *Populism of the Twenty First Century*. Baltimore and Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 269–95.

Degregori, Carlos Iván. 1991. "El aprendiz de brujo y el curandero chino," in Carlos Iván Degregori, Carlos Iván and Romeo Grompone (eds), *Demonios y redentores en el nuevo Perú*. Lima: IEP, 71–137.

de la Torre, Carlos. 2010. *Populist Seduction in Latin America*, 2nd edn. Athens: Ohio University Press.

de la Torre, Carlos. 2012. "Correa un populista del siglo XXI," in Isidoro Cheresky (ed.), *¿Qué Democracia en América Latina?* Buenos Aires: CLACSO Prometeo, 251–81.

de la Torre, Carlos. 2013. "El Tecnopopulismo de Rafael Correa. ¿Es compatible el carisma con la tecnocracia?," *Latin American Research Review*, 48(1): 24–43.

de la Torre, Carlos and Cynthia Arnson. 2013. "Introduction: the evolution of Latin American populism and the debates over its meanings," in Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia Arnson (eds), *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century*. Baltimore and Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1–37.

French, John. 2009. "Understanding the politics of Latin America's plural lefts (Chavez/Lula): social democracy, populism and convergence on the path to a post-neoliberal world," *Third World Quarterly*, 30(2): 249–70.

(p. 212) García Guadilla, María Pilar. 2007. "Ciudadanía y autonomía en las organizaciones sociales bolivarianas: los Comités de Tierra Urbana como movimientos sociales," *Cuadernos del CENDES*, 24(6): 47–73.

Germani, Gino. 1971. *Política y sociedad en una epoca de transición*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos.

Gómez Calcaño, Luis and Nancy Arenas. 2013. "El populismo chavista: autoritarismo electoral para amigos y enemigos," *Cuadernos del CENDES*, 82: 17–34.

Hawkins, Kirk. 2008. "La organización populista. Los Cículos Bolivarianos en Venezuela," in Carlos de la Torre and Enrique Peruzzotti (eds), *El retorno del Pueblo*. Quito: FLACSO, 125–60.

Hawkins, Kirk. 2010. *Venezuela's Chavism and Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hawkins, Kirk and David Hansen. 2006. "Dependent civil society: the Círculos Bolivarianos in Venezuela," *Latin American Research Review*, 41(1): 102–32.

James, Daniel. 1988. *Resistance and Integration. Peronism and the Argentine Working Class 1946–1976*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. "Populism: what's in a name?," in Francisco Panizza (ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*. London: Verso, 32–55.

Levitsky, Steven. 2001. "An 'organized disorganization': informal organisation and the persistance of local party structures in Argentine Peronism," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 33: 29–65.

Levitsky, Steven and Kenneth Roberts (eds). 2011. *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

López Maya, Margarita and Alexandra Panzarelli. 2013. "Populism, rentierism, and socialism in the twenty-first century: the case of Venezuela," in Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia Arnson (eds), *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century*. Baltimore and Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 239–69.

Lustig, Nora. 2009. "Poverty, inequality, and the New Left in Latin America," *Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the Americas*, October. **http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/ default/files/LAP_090716_LustigBulletinENG_1.pdf**.

Madrid, Raúl. 2012. *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McClintock, Cynthia. 2013. "Populism in Peru: from APRA to Ollanta Humala," in Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia Arnson (eds), *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century*. Baltimore and Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 203–39.

Menéndez-Carrión, Amparo. 1986. *La conquista del voto*. Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional.

Milanesio, Natalia. 2010. "Peronists and Cabecitas: stereotypes and anxieties at the peak of social change," in Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa (eds), *The New Cultural History of Peronism*. Durham: Duke University Press, 53–85.

Navarro, Marysa. 1982. "Evitas's charismatic leadership," in Michael Conniff (ed.), *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 47–67.

Novaro, Marcos and Vicente Palermo. 1996. *Política y poder en el gobierno de Menem*. Buenos Aires: FLACSO and Norma.

(p. 213) Peruzzotti, Enrique. 2008. "Populismo y representación democrática," in Carlos de la Torrre and Enrique Peruzzotti (eds), *El Retorno del Pueblo*. Quito: FLACSO, 97–125.

Plotkin, Martin. 2003. *Mañana es San Perón: A Cultural History of Peron's Argentina*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources.

Plotkin, Martin. 2010. "Final reflections," in Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa (eds), *The New Cultural History of Peronism*. Durham: Duke University Press, 271–87.

Postero, Nancy. 2010. "Morales's MAS government building indigenous popular hegemony in Bolivia," *Latin American Perspectives*, 37(3): 18–34.

Postero, Nancy. 2015. "El pueblo Boliviano de composición plural: a look at plurinationalism in Bolivia," in Carlos de la Torre (ed.), *The Promise and Perils of Populism*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 398–431.

Raby, D. L. 2006. *Democracy and Revolution: Latin America and Socialism Today*. London: Pluto Press.

Roberts, Kenneth. 2006. "Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, 38(2): 127–48.

Roberts, Kenneth. 2015. "Populism, political mobilizations, and crises of political representation," in Carlos de la Torre (ed.), *The Promise and Perils of Populism*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 140–59.

Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal. 2015. "Explaining the emergence of populism in Europe and the Americas," in Carlos de la Torre (ed.), *The Promise and Perils of Populism*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 189–231.

Waisbord, Silvio. 2013. *Vox Populista: Medios, periodismo, democracia*. Buenos Aires: Gedisa.

Weyland, Kurt. 1999. "Populism in the age of neoliberalism," in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), *Populism in Latin America*. Tucaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 172–91.

Weyland, Kurt. 2001. "Clarifying a contested concept," *Comparative Politics*, 34(1): 1–22.

Weyland, Kurt. 2006. "The rise of Latin America's two lefts: insights from rentier state theory," *Comparative Politics*, 41(2): 145–64.

Weyland, Kurt, Raúl Madrid, and Wendy Hunter (eds). 2010. *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilpert, Gregory. 2007. *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chávez Government*. London: Verso.

Wolfe, Joel. 1994. "'Father of the poor' or 'mother of the rich'? Getúlio Vargas, industrial workers, and constructions of class, gender, and populism in São Paulo, 1930–1954," *Radical History Review*, 58(80): 80–112.

Zamosc, León. 2013. "Popular impeachments: Ecuador in comparative perspective," in Mario Sznajder, Luis Roniger, and Carlos Forment (eds), *Shifting Frontiers of Citizenship: The Latin American Experience*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 237–67.

Zúquete, José Pedro. 2008. "The missionary politics of Hugo Chávez," *Latin American Politics and Society*, 50(1): 91–122.

Notes:

Carlos de la Torre

Carlos de la Torre, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Kentucky, US